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A. Wayne MacKay* The Legislature, The Executive
And The Courts: The Delicate
Balance Of Power Or Who Is
Running This Country Anyway?
The expanding role of Canadian courts since the introduction of the Charter has
prompted critics to decry what they see as excessive and "anti-democratic"
judicial activism. The author addresses such criticisms, responding, in particular,
to the arguments of Ted Morton and Rainer Knopff. The article critiques the basic
elements of Morton/Knopf's thesis: that activist courts are anti-democratic,
excessively political, and engaging in illegitimate law-making. Rejecting the claim
that Canada's judiciary is a less democratic state institution, the author notes the
powerful law and policy-making role performed by the federal cabinet-for
practical purposes, an unelected body. The author endorses the dialogue in
which courts and legislators have engaged since 1982. This dialogue, he argues,
is not only democratic, but also ensures accountability for the judiciary, the
legislature, and the executive. Referring to recent Supreme Court of Canada
decisions, the author suggests that critics of "interventionist" courts harbor a
narrow and simplistic "majoritarian" view of democracy, rather than a more
nuanced and rights-sensitive concept of enhanced democracy. Such critics also
seem more displeased with the substance of "activist" decisions than with the
legitimacy of the courts in rendering them. The author concludes that Canadian
courts are performing their appropriate constitutional role, and are generally
doing so effectively.
L'intervention accrue des tribunaux canadiens depuis la promulgation de la
Charte a pouss6 certaines critiques a denoncer le recours abusif aux tribunaux
pour des vell6it6s qu'ils qualifient volontiers "d'antid6mocratiques". L'auteur
tente de r~futer ces arguments et en particulier ceux de Ted Morton et de Rainer
Knopff. II s'attaque aux pr6misses de base de la these soutenue par Morton et
Knopff selon laquelle les tribunaux militants font entorse au processus
democratique, sont influences par des considerations politiques et se livrent i
une r6forme du droit outrepassant leur comp6tence. L'auteur rejette d'embl6e la
notion que le tribunal est une institution moins d6mocratique que les autres.
Personne ne conteste la comp6tence du cabinet f6deral en matiere de droit et de
promulgation depolitiques. Ils'agitpourtant d'un organisme non 6lu. L'auteur voit
d'un bon oeil le dialogue auquel se livrent les 16gislateurs et les tribunaux depuis
1982. Ce dialogue est non seulement democratique mais il assure une plus
grande transparence de la magistrature, de I'assembl6e legislative etde I'ex6cutif.
Citant a I'appui, les dcisions r6centes de la Cour supr6me du Canada, l'auteur
* President and Vice-Chancellor, Mount Allison University and, formerly, Director of the
Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission (1995 - 1998) and Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law
School (until 2001). The author wishes to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of
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accuse les detracteurs des tribunaux ointerventionnistes' de pr~coniser une
vision 6triqu6e la d6mocratie selon laquelle celle-ci doit refl~ter uniquement la
volont6 de la majorit6. Or, la v~ritable d6mocratie doit s'exercer de fagon plus
nuanc~e et demeurer sensible aux droits des minorit~s. En d6finitive, les
d6tracteurs semblent davantage contester le contenu des decisions soit-disant
militantes que la l6gitimitO des tribunaux quiles rendent. Les tribunaux canadiens
remplissent les fonctions constitutionnelles qui leur ont 6t6 confi6es et s'en
acquittent tr~s bien de conclure I'auteur.
I. Criticizing the Role of the Courts in Democracy: The Ted Morton
and Rainer Knopff Critique
II. In Defence of the Courts: The Proper Judicial Role in a
Constitutional Democracy
1. The Definition of Democracy in Canada
2. Activism and Restraint: The Thin Line Between Adjudication and
Politics
a. Defining Judicial Activism
b. Exercising the New Judicial Role: Dialogue Not Dissonance
Section 33 and Other Responses
Influence of the Charter on the Legislators
3. A Legitimate Expansion of the Judicial Process to Promote
"Contextualized" Decision-Making
a. Interest Group Intervention
b. The Emerging Jurocracy
III. Objections to a Changing Value Structure: Concluding Thoughts
I. Criticizing the Role of the Courts in Democracy:
The Ted Morton and Rainer Knopff Critique
It is easy to sympathize with the courts which seem to be subjected to
criticism regardless of what they do. In the pre-Charter days, the courts
were often criticized for being too restrained and conservative in their
approach to the judicial role, following in the tradition of the British
courts rather than that of their more activist cousins to the south. These
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objections generally came from people on the left of the political
spectrum, who were looking for a change to the status quo. Since the
arrival of the Charter' in 1982, the courts are still subject to some
criticism from the left for judicializing politics and setting back gains
made in the legislative arena. 2 However, more recently, they have been
exposed to a critique from the right side of the political spectrum as well.
Part of this critique from the right is that the courts have become too
activist in their role and have blurred the lines between judging and
politics. Both the critics from the left and the right decry the appointed,
and therefore allegedly anti-democratic, nature of the courts.
The most sustained and detailed of these recent critiques from the right
is that of Professors Ted Morton and Rainer Knopff in their much
publicized book, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party.3 I shall
reserve my detailed presentation of their views for the next part of this
article, where I will attempt to refute most of their allegations against the
courts. The essential elements of their critique are three:
1. The Courts are Anti-Democratic;
2. The Courts are Too Activist and Political;
3. The Expansion of the Judicial Role is Illegitimate.
Morton and Knopff define democracy in majoritarian terms and see
the expanded policy-making role of the courts as largely advancing
minority interests. These interests have either failed to win approval in the
political process or not attempted to navigate the political waters at all.
Therefore, they do not represent the majority of society and have not
followed the normal political route for achieving consensus. Morton and
Knopff also point to the appointed nature of the judges and argue that they
are ill equipped for a political role of the kind pursued since the arrival of
the Charter. The authors use the fact that judges are appointed to
underscore the undemocratic nature of judicial policy-making; yet they
fail to assess how democratic the elected branch of government is-in
particular, the Executive. Their wariness of an appointed judiciary blends
into the second aspect of their complaint against the expanded judicial
role, namely that judges have become too political and are reversing
decisions made by the elected branch of government. Morton and Knopff
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1I [hereinafter Charter].
2. M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Wall and Thompson, 1989).
3. F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough,
Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000) Professors Morton and Knopff are both political scientists at the
University of Calgary.
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object to both the results and the process by which these results are
achieved. In their view both are anti-democratic and inappropriate for the
judicial role in Canadian society.
Finally, the authors question the legitimacy of this new ascendancy of
the courts as a major policy maker in Canada. Their attack is not so much
on the Charter itself as on the judges' broad interpretation of it, and of
related constitutional documents. Morton and Knopff also see a more
sinister aspect to the situation with the emergence of the Court Party, a
term they use to describe a collection of various interest groups including
equality seekers, civil libertarians, intelligentsia and other interests. It is
feared that the courts have become captive to these various interest
groups, who, by intervening in important cases, have been able to avoid
the normal political process and set the agenda for the courts. Morton and
Knopff are particularly concerned about the role of law clerks and law
professors in providing a channel for the special interest groups to
influence judicial decision-making.
Underlying their objections to the process of judicial decision-making
is a strong dissatisfaction with the shift in values being ushered in by the
courts. In this regard they express particular concern about the broad
definition of equality being promoted by courts and human rights
tribunals under both the Charter and human rights legislation. The
authors see these changes not as the logical result of the texts of the
Charter and the human rights codes, but rather as the product of activist
judicial interpretation that is aided and abetted by the lobbying of special
interest groups.
Throughout their book Morton and Knopff refer to "special interest"
groups without making any distinction between interests and rights. In
keeping with this terminology, there is a clear tone in the book that these
"special interest" groups are in some sense illegitimate, or at least that
they are attempting to achieve their purposes by questionable means.
Many of those so called interest groups, such as the equality seekers,
could more accurately be referred to as rights seeking groups-a termi-
nology which would accord them a higher and more legitimate status.
This debate about the proper terminology is reflective of a more substan-
tive disagreement between myself and Morton and Knopff as to the
proper role of courts in Canada and the legitimacy of vindicating rights
in courts, without succumbing to a purely political choice between
conflicting "interest groups".
I will argue that the role of the courts is in balance with the legislative
role. The dialogue between the two bodies is democratic and provides a
method of accountability for both branches of the state. The judges
preserve the values enshrined by the Charter, while the legislators
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continue to represent Canadian society. Without an independent court
system, governments could go unchallenged, especially where there is
little real opposition in a government-dominated legislative chamber.
However, without the power to implement and change legislation to
reflect a changing / evolving society, the country would be run by an
appointed few. That appointed few would not be the judges about whom
Morton and Knopff complain, but rather the Prime Minister and the
members of Cabinet.
For even though Canada's executive branch must be selected from the
elected branch of government (unlike the separation of powers in the
United States), the party system provides little real accountability to the
elected branch for Cabinet, which is the real heart of power. Together,
courts and legislatures can achieve a balance that upholds democracy and
protects both majority and minority rights. This combination achieves a
democracy in its more sophisticated and nuanced form as I shall explore
further in the next section of this article.
II. In Defence of the Courts: the Proper Judicial Role in a
Constitutional Democracy
1. The Definition of Democracy in Canada
One of the most fundamental critiques that Professors Morton and Knopff
make is that the expansion of the role of the courts in Canada since 1982
is anti-democratic and significantly shifts policy making away from the
elected representatives of the people. The authors set out their somewhat
idealized definition of democracy in the following terms:
Our primary objection to the Charter Revolution is that it is deeply and
fundamentally undemocratic, not just in the simple and obvious sense of
being anti-majoritarian, but also in the more serious sense of eroding the
habits and temperament of representative democracy.
The growth of courtroom rights talk undermines perhaps the fundamental
prerequisite of decent liberal democratic politics: the willingness to
engage with whom one disagrees in the ongoing attempt to combine
diverse interests into temporarily viable governing majorities.'4
Although this articulation could support a protection of minority as
well as majority views, this idealized concept, as developed in their book,
in practical terms gives the majority view clear preference. Indeed, such
majoritarian privilege is inherent in Canada's current political structure,
as in that of most western democracies.
4. Ibid. at 149.
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This "majoritarian" definition of democracy is not in accordance with
the more nuanced modem versions of democracy in which respect for
minority interests, as well as attention to majority will, is vital. Another
group of political science professors in Final Appeal: Decision-Making
in Canadian Courts of Appeal, I define democracy in much broader
terms:
[W]e argue that the debate about whether judicial lawmaking undermines
democracy becomes far less important when democracy is considered not
merely as lawmaking through elected legislatures, but more basically as
government operating on the principle of mutual respect. A more impor-
tant question for debate is whether judges tend to pursue decision-making
strategies designed to give effect to democratic principles.6
Later in referring to the Reference Re Secession of Quebec7 the authors
of Final Appeal link their definition to that of the Supreme Court of
Canada:
The court listed a number of the important ingredients for democracy. But,
we argue, behind all these the basic principle from which the notion of
democratic government arises is the principle of mutual respect. Indeed,
democracy can be thought of as government based on the principle of
mutual respect.8
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec9 the Supreme Court of Canada
articulated the underlying principles of the Canadian Constitution includ-
ing: federalism, democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of
minorities. The Court saw these principles as interconnected, and thus
democracy must take account of the rule of law and vice versa. The Court
defines democracy as follows:
Finally we highlight that a functioning democracy requires a continuous
process of discussion. The Constitution mandates government by demo-
cratic legislatures, and an executive accountable to them, 'resting ulti-
mately on public opinion reached by discussion and the interplay of ideas'
(Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, at p. 330). At both the federal and
provincial level, by its very nature, the need to build majorities necessitates
compromise, negotiation, and deliberation. No one has a monopoly on
truth, and our system is predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of
ideas, the best solutions to public problems will rise to the top. Inevitably,
there will be dissenting voices. A democratic system of government is
committed to considering those dissenting voices, and seeking to ac-
5. I. Greene et al., Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto:
Lormier & Co. Ltd., 1998) [hereinafter Final Appeal].
6. Ibid. at 2.
7. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter Reference Re Secession of Quebec].
8. I. Greene et al., supra note 5 at 11.
9. Supra note 7.
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knowledge and address those voices in the law by which all in the
community must live.'0
Further, in this decision the Court refers to the requirement of an
"enhanced majority" as a way of protecting minority interests in the
process of constitutional change." Democracy is more than the mere
expression of simple majority will.
A good illustration of the different outcomes that can be achieved by
using different conceptions of democracy is provided by the Supreme
Court of Canada decision of R. v. Latimer.2 This high profile and
controversial case involving the Saskatchewan farmer who killed his
daughter, who was seriously disabled, in what is generally referred to as
"mercy killing," sparked national debate. While some polls suggest that
as many as 75% of Canadians support mercy killing and think that Mr.
Latimer should not be severely punished, there are strongly held views
that to give any special clemency to Mr. Latimer would devalue the lives
of the disabled. The disabled and their supporters who hold this latter
view would be an example of the minority interest group, who Morton
and Knopff think have too much influence on the courts. The Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the mandatory ten year minimum statutory jail
time for Mr. Latimer and would likely be seen by Morton and Knopff as
thereby vindicating the interests of the disabled lobby, even in the face of
a strong majority sentiment to be more lenient with Mr. Latimer. The
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada might well answer that they were
merely upholding the sanctity of human life by applying the legislatively
dictated minimum ten year sentence.
Thus, while the majority of Canadians (according to polls reported in
the newspapers), were apparently more concerned about compassion for
the well intentioned father who took his daughter's life than for the life
of the disabled child and its sanctity, the justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada had a different view. A majoritarian view of democracy in its
literal sense would not have protected the rights of the disabled in this
case. The Supreme Court of Canada, applying a view of "enhanced
democracy" that balances the competing rights in society, upheld the
right to life in Canadian society for all its members, including the
disabled. The position of the Supreme Court of Canada respects the
foundational value of the sanctity of human life, as reflected in the
Charter ofRights but also as widely accepted by a majority of Canadians.
The Latimer case provides a good illustratioh of the vital contribution of
10. Ibid. at para. 68.
11. Ibid. at para. 77.
12. [20011 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Latimer].
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the courts to the protection of minority rights and the rule of law as a vital
component of a true democracy. 3
The complex nature of value disputes that must be resolved in modem
democracies such as Canada can rarely be neatly divided into majority
against minority. In Trinity Western University v. B.C. College of
Teachers14 the Supreme Court of Canada had to balance minority
religious views opposed to homosexuality and the equality rights of gays
and lesbians. In essence, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
whether British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) had jurisdiction
to consider whether Trinity Western University's program was discrimi-
natory as well as the appropriate standard of judicial review. However,
the Court also addressed how to reconcile the religious freedoms of
individuals wishing to attend Trinity Western University with the equal-
ity concerns of students in the British Columbia school system.
The Majority (lacobucci and Bastarche JJ. forMcLachlin C.J., Gonthier,
Major, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.) felt that the appropriate standard of
review was correctness (based on absence of a privative clause, the
expertise of the BCCT, the nature of the decision, and the statutory
context). With respect to the balancing of freedom of religion and
equality rights, the court states that freedoms are not absolute." Rather,
they feel that the key "to drawing the line" is distinguishing between
holding discriminatory views and acting on them and conclude, "[tihe
freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them." 6 The
court goes on to say that acting on discriminatory beliefs would result in
discipline being instituted against the actor. However, if a court were to
limit the freedom of religion, it could only do so if evidence were adduced
to show discriminatory conduct; there was no such evidence in this case.
The Supreme Court of Canada seems, then, to focus on the rights of the
teachers and institutions as opposed to the rights of the students. The
Court was satisfied that, because there was no evidence of discrimination,
they should not restrict the freedom of religion.
L'Heureux-Dub6 was the sole dissenter in this case. She felt that the
appropriate standard of review was patent unreasonableness since BCCT,
as the expert teacher certification body, was supposed to review teaching
programs and develop policy. The decision of the BCCT was not patently
13. This is not to suggest that courts in Canada have always been the champions of minority
fights, and our record in this regard is not as impressive as the selective historical account in
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 7, would suggest. However, the courts have
played an increasingly important role in counter balancing the majoritarian tendencies of the
legislative branch of the state.
14. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [hereinafter Trinity].
15. Ibid. at paras. 29-32 ff.
16. Ibid. at para. 36.
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unreasonable as "signing the contract makes the student or employee
complicit in an overt, but not illegal, act of discrimination against
homosexuals and bisexuals". 7 Justice L'Heureux-Dub further states,
With respect, I do not see why my colleagues classify this signature as part
of the freedom of belief as opposed to the narrower freedom to act on those
beliefs. .. " In Ross,19 ... the Board of Inquiry noted that human rights
legislation 'does not prohibit a person from thinking or holding prejudicial
views. The Act, however, may affect the right of that person to be a teacher
when those views are publicly expressed in a manner that impacts on the
school community or if those views influence the treatment of students in
the classroom by the teacher.. '20
It would be difficult to ascertain the majority sentiment of Canadians
in this case, and it is not the role of the Court to do so. Instead, the Court
turned to the guarantees of freedom of religion and equality in the Charter
of Rights and gave preference to freedom of religion and thought, at least
to the point where acting on one's beliefs would violate the equality rights
of gays and lesbians, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, in dissent, would have
come down on the side of the equality rights of gays and lesbians and
argued that the majority position devalued their rights to dignity and
respect. To resolve disputes in majoritarian terms does not do justice to
the complexity of the value disputes that confront all branches of the
modem democratic state. The enhanced view of democracy which
encompasses the protection of both majority and minority interests offers
greater promise for a fair and responsive state that respects the rights of
all its citizens.
In this broader view, there is an important and legitimate role for the
courts as protectors of minority interests in a constitutional democracy.
The authors of Final Appeal refer to the work of Professor David Beattie
as one writer who embraces the courts as promoters of democracy:
David Beattie stepped into the democracy versus the courts debate with his
book Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice. Beattie argued that in the
current complex political environment, issues of individual fairness are
liable not to get the attention they deserve from elected politicians.
Therefore, a transfer of some decision-making power to the courts is not
a bad thing in order to prevent the legitimate rights claims of individuals-
claims legitimized by laws enacted by democratically elected legisla-
tures-from falling into the cracks. Judicial participation in policy-
making is therefore essential to preserve fundamental democratic norms.2'
17. Ibid. at para. 72.
18. Ibid. at para. 72.
19. This reference is to Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825
[hereinafter Ross].
20. From para. 39 of Ross, ibid [emphasis added by L'Heureux-Dubd J., Trinity, supra note
14 at para. 72].
21. Supra note 5 at 9.
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The role of the courts is even more emphatically asserted by Professor
Martha Jackman in the following passage:
From the foregoing discussion I hope that it has become clear thatjudicial
review of executive and legislative action on Charter grounds has the
potential to enhance rather than, necessarily, to detract from the quality of
democratic decision-making at all levels of government. By interpreting
section 7 principles of fundamental justice to require meaningful partici-
pation by those whose interests are affected in individualized
decision-making, in broader policy making within the executive branch,
and in the legislative process itself, the courts can provide an important
avenue for challenges to antidemocratic tendencies in our current parlia-
mentary system.22
In her reference to the "anti-democratic tendencies in our current
parliamentary system", Professor Jackman also highlights another weak-
ness in the Morton and Knopff critique of the role of the courts in
Canadian society. Professor Jackman argues that merely because the
legislators are elected does not ensure that they are accountable or fully
represent the people in the practical sense. It is easy to overstate the
accessibility of the legislative structure, when so much power is concen-
trated in the Cabinet-as the pinnacle of the executive structure. This
concentration of power, which is reinforced by strict party discipline,
means that policy-making in Canada is largely removed from our elected
representatives and placed in the hands of the executive. In comparison
with the power of the executive, the power of the courts is extremely
limited. This is a point recognized by other writers as well:
When, in the course ofjudicial review, the courts are compelled to examine
policy questions, the narrow and issue-specific scope of inquiry cannot be
compared to the broad mandate that governments have to make compre-
hensive policies within their constitutionally defined jurisdictions. Senior
government bureaucrats, who exercise overall much greater impact on
policy and its implementation, are as unelected, unrepresentative, and
socially privileged as judges, and their accountability to the public leaves
a great deal to be desired.23
Since Morton and Knopff are concerned with the exercise of power by
unelected people, I suggest that their main concern should be the potential
abuse of power by unelected bureaucrats.
22. M. Jackman, "Separate but not Apart: The Role of the Courts in Canada's Post Charter
Democracy" in D. Magnusson, D.A. Soberman & W.R. Lederman, Canadian Constitutional
Dilemmas Revisited (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queens Uni-
versity, 1997) at 40.
23. I. Greene et al., supra note 5 at 5.
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There is an important role for the courts in making the executive branch
of government more accountable.14 This is a traditional role performed
by courts under the common law principles of administrative law and the
interpretation and application of statutes designed to ensure that admin-
istrators operate within proper bounds in both procedural and substantive
terms. This judicial role has been enhanced since 1982 by extending the
role of the courts in constitutional review to violations of Charter rights
and Aboriginal rights as well as the traditional division of powers
analysis. Thus, the courts and judicial review are an integral part of our
democratic structure and not antithetical to it as Professors Morton and
Knopff suggest.
2. Activism and Restraint: The Thin Line Between Adjudication and
Politics
Striking the proper balance between restraint and activism in adjudicat-
ing disputes has always been a difficult task and one that sparks criticism
of the courts. In the past the courts have been criticized as being too
conservative and restrained in their approach to judicial decision-mak-
ing. Typical of this kind of complaint was the controversial book by
Professor Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme
Court of Canada.2" As previously mentioned, the criticisms of the courts
have changed since the arrival of the Charter in 1982. Earlier criticism that
stemmed from the left, has now been replaced by criticisms from the right.
It is now argued that the courts are too activist and are usurping the policy-
making role of the elected branch of government. This new criticism is
pointedly made by Morton and Knopff in the following passage:
It is extensive recourse to the courtroom as a policymaking arena, not
necessarily the particular outcomes of litigation, that constitutes the heart
of the Charter revolution....
In a dazzling exercise of self-empowerment, the Supreme Court has
transformed itself from an adjudicator of disputes to a constitutional oracle
that is able and willing to pronounce on the validity of a broad range of
public policies.26
24. Professor Morton, himself, in an earlier article acknowledges that the use of judicial
review against the executive is often to enforce, not frustrate, legislative policy. F.L. Morton,
"The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 20 Can. J. of
Pol. Sci. 31. I am not suggesting that the bureaucrats are not guided by the law, for most are.
My argument is that judges by training and background are well suited to ensure that the rule
of law not be eclipsed by the everyday pressures of politics. The courts can make the Executive
accountable in ways that the legislative branch cannot.
25. This book was particularly controversial because of its blunt criticisms of the Supreme
Court. Such criticisms were not common at that time. P. Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical
Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1974).
26. Supra note 3 at 21, 34.
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a. Defining Judicial Activism
One of the central problems in the activism and restraint debate is
defining what is meant by judicial activism. It is interesting to note that
Professor Morton expressed a more positive view of judicial review
under the Charter in an earlier article. He states:
With respect to other Charter rights such as the ... Equality Rights
provisions, judicial review may assist in weeding out archaic and poorly
drafted statutes and forcing responsible legislatures to rewrite their stat-
utes in a manner that provides greater protection for the important political
values embodied in the Charter.2 7
In this same article, Professor Morton described the effect of the Charter
as producing constitutional supremacy notjudicial supremacy. However,
in their book, Morton and Knopff express a quite different opinion,
In refuting an earlier assertion by Professor Patrick Monahan28 ,
Professors Morton and Knopff make the following analysis of the
activism of the Supreme Court since the arrival of the Charter:
Although this jurisprudence is clearly activist, many of the relevant cases
overrule police practices rather than laws, and are thus not counted in
Monahan's activism statistics. Had Monahan counted them, his activism
figures would have been higher. Similarly, granting Monahan's definition
of activism, the rate at which statutes are nullified should be based not on
all Charter challenges but only on those actually involving challenges to
legislation. Counting just Charter challenges to statutes over 16 years the
nullification rate is 32 per cent (58/183), not 16 per cent (58/373). In
addition, Monahan's concentration on the nullification of statutes fails to
account for cases like Butler and Egan, which, as we have seen, involve
considerable policy innovation in the very course of upholding a statute.
Finally, global assessments of activism and innovation mask concentra-
tions of judicial policy-making in certain areas. For example, a study of 47
cases involving feminist issues found a success rate of 70 per cent.
Similarly, pockets of activism and innovation exist in litigation involving
aboriginal rights, language rights, and gay rights. Indeed, as we noted
above the Court's gay-rights ruling in M. v. H., a same-sex-spouse
decision, lays the groundwork for invalidating hundreds of federal and
provincial laws. A single blockbuster case like this renders denials of
judicial activism problematic.29
While striking down legislation can have large implications, uphold-
ing legislation can be just as important. Professor Kent Roach supports
the view that judicial activism can be expressed just as much in the
27. Supra note 24 at 53.
28. J. Tibbets, "Top Court Judges Shy Away From Rewriting Laws: Study" National Post (9
April 1999).
29. Supra note 3 at 20.
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upholding of a statute or government policy, as in striking it down.30 In
fact he suggests that when a court renders a statute Charter proof, that is
in some ways more activist than striking the statute down, as such a
decision to uphold effectively ends the dialogue between the courts and
the legislatures. This is particularly true when the decision is made by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Professor Roach also argues in his article that
judicial activism is a healthy thing which has been practiced in both
common law cases and constitutional law cases, long before the Charter.
Roach is a strong supporter of the judicial / legislative dialogue, which,
he argues, produces better laws at the end of the day.
Professors Morton and Knopff assume that judicial activism is nor-
mally used to attack the legislative status quo and thus pits the courts
against the policies of the other branches of government. This is not
always the case, as evidenced by a recent decision in which the statutory
waiver of a requirement for warrants in the non-emergency apprehension
of children was upheld by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada.'I
The majority decision of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 was criticized in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Arbour as straying too far into the field of
social policy, and in that sense being activist. This is an example of
activism in support of a legislative policy aimed at protecting children.
To further complicate matters, the courts can strike down legislation
without engaging in judicial activism. A good example of this is the
decision from the Alberta courts striking down the spending limits
imposed by the federal Elections Act.32 In the name of freedom of
expression, the Alberta courts issued a temporary injunction nullifying
the spending limits imposed by statute. In so doing they opposed
legislative policy, but also promoted the traditional status quo, whereby
limits were not placed upon groups wanting to spend money on elec-
tions-such as the National Citizens Coalition.
Because the Supreme Court of Canada has been seen as more activist
since the Charter, there have been calls to restrain the power of the
judiciary.33 This movement has been especially strong within the Reform
Party (now the Canadian Alliance), which would like to see the establish-
ment of a committee to review decisions of the Supreme Court. This
committee would advise Parliament as to whether any legislative action
30. K. Roach, "Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and
Canadian Legislatures" (2001) 80:1&2 Can. Bar Rev. 481 at 485.
31. Winnipeg Childand Family Services v. K.L. W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519 [hereinafter K.L. W. ].
32. J. Gatehouse, "Campaign Gag Law Sent Into Limbo" National Post (24 October 2000).
The decisions of the Alberta courts were reversed in the Supreme Court of Canada, which
upheld the spending limits in the Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2.
33. Morton and Knopff are among the leading critics of the Supreme Court of Canada's
activism. See e.g. supra note 3.
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is necessary, including the use of the notwithstanding clause, to restore
the legislation or the application of the Charter to its original intent. 4 An
example of the discontent was apparent when intergovernmental affairs
Minister Norm Sterling wrote to Justice Minister Anne McLellan, "Re-
cently, decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have increasingly
shifted toward determining social and economic policy. Decisions that
have such effects are not in accordance with the public's understanding
of the respective role of legislators and the judiciary in our parliamentary
and legal systems."35
Judicial activism has been defined by the late Justice MacGuigan as
"an approach that recognizes, accepts and tends to exercise the judicial
role as legislator. 3 6 Morton and Knopff define it as "the disposition [of
judges] to interpret rights broadly and enforce them vigorously."37
Judicial activism is cited as the problem when judges use non-traditional
principles to protect the rights of individuals or groups; thus, one's
definition of judicial activism is clearly related to one's belief about the
proper constitutional role of a judge."
In order to determine whether or not the court has engaged in judicial
activism, one must look beyond the form of a decision, to its effects.
Striking down legislation does not always amount to activism. Similarly,
the court may engage in judicial activism merely by upholding the
constitutional validity of legislation. In both cases, the question is the
same: is the court's decision primarily legal or primarily political? If it is
primarily political, this is an example of judicial activisim.
I prefer the definition of activism put forward by the late Justice
MacGuigan, which emphasizes the way in which decisions are made
rather than the substantive result. This was the nature of the debate
between Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and Justice Arbour in the recent case
on warrants in child apprehensions. The dissenting justices argued that
Justice L'Heureux-Dub based her decision too much on social policy
and the desirability of protecting children.3 9 It can be argued that Justice
Arbour in dissent (joined by Chief Justice McLachlin) examined the
policy issues, but in the context of the competing legal principles, such as
parental rights.
34. P. Manning, "Parliament, Not Judges, Must Make the Laws of the Land" Globe and Mail
(16 June 1998) A23.
35. "Judicial Activism is otaFigmettofthelmagination" Globe and Mail (I October 1999)
A16.
36. Hon. M. MacGuigan, "Sources of Judicial Decision Making" in S. Martin & K. E. Mahoney,
eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Calgary: Carswell Legal Publication, 1987) at 30.
37. R. Knopff& F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992) at 19.
38. Hon. B. Dickson, "Madam Justice Wilson, Trailblazer for Justice" (1992) 15 Dal. L. at 9.
39. K.L.W, supra note 31.
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Another illustration of this point is the performance of the Supreme
Court in cases concerning Aboriginal rights. In leading cases such as R.
v. Van derPeet4° and R. v. Gladstone4 the various judges took different
approaches to their difficult task of defining Aboriginal rights. In these
cases Justice McLachlin (as she then was) criticized the approach taken
by then Chief Justice Lamer as based too heavily upon a balancing of the
competing interests of the Aboriginal and non Aboriginal segments of
society. She was more sceptical than Chief Justice Lamer of the concept
of reconciliation, as the foundation of the guarantees in section 35 of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982.42 Justice McLachlin in Van derPeetand Gladstone
preferred to build on the common law in defining the proper scope and
meaning of Aboriginal rights. Her preference was to anchor the Court's
decisions in law as modified by policy, rather than to base decisions
directly on policy and modify the law accordingly. In Justice McLachlin' s
view, the approach of Chief Justice Lamer in the Aboriginal cases blurs
the line between law and politics.
This same kind of debate emerged again in the R. v. Marshall" cases
involving the proper interpretation of fishing rights under a 1760 treaty
between the Mi' kmaq and the Crown. Once again Chief Justice McLachlin
favoured a more legalistic and narrower interpretation of the Treaty than
the majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Binnie. Using
evidence extrinsic to the Treaty, Justice Binnie found a meaning for the
Treaty which he felt would do justice to the honour of the Crown, even
if it seemed to go well beyond the text of the Treaty.
One could certainly sympathize with the Court for feeling unfairly
criticized for activism in the Aboriginal rights area, as the other branches
of government have failed to define Aboriginal rights at any level. Not
only have the various levels of government had little success in making
agreements with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, but also they have
failed to define Aboriginal rights in the series of conferences proposed in
the Constitution Act, 1982. Thus the courts have inherited this difficult
task by default. It is also hard to imagine how an issue as contentious as
the definition of Aboriginal rights could be resolved without in some way
entering the realm of political debate. As I have argued elsewhere,
judging is in many ways an inherently political process and this is
particularly evident in dealing with constitutional matters, in all their
forms.44
40. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van der Peet].
41. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Gladstone].
42. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I1.
43. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Marshall, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 533.
44. W. MacKay, "The Supreme Court ofCanada and Federalism: Does/ Should Anyone Care
Anymore?" (2001) 80:1 & 2 Can. Bar Rev. 241 at 255.
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One of the central complaints of Morton and Knopff is thatjudges have
a blank cheque in making policy under the Charter, and that this is not
appropriate for an un-elected branch of the state. This idea that judges
have unbridled discretion in making their decisions has been challenged
by other writers such as the authors of Final Appeal who refer to the
following restraints on judging:
[First] there are some outcomes that individual decision-makers might
personally prefer but that cannot be linked to the kind of 'reasons' that
other actors will accept. Second, the giving of reasons exposes a logical
trail that invites further examination and subsequent review by a 'higher'
court, a review that would be far more difficult if a decision were simply
a flat one-line outcome. Third, the giving of reasons constitutes a promise
of similar treatment to similar actors in the future, a way in which they can
make undesirable outcomes less likely and desirable outcomes more likely
simply by shaping their actions so as to conform with the standards that the
immediate case declares.45
Elsewhere I argue that while judges do have a broad discretion, they
are still tethered, even if it is more by a "bungee cord" than a chain.46 Their
branch of politics is different from that of the legislators and administra-
tors. This expanded role for the courts adds fuel to the arguments that we
need to rethink our processes for appointing and educating judges and
reconsider issues such as representation and diversity on the Bench. 47
This raises the large issue of who will sit as judges and what perspectives
they bring to the task of judging. Judges are not supposed to be represen-
tative in the sense of speaking on behalf of particular people or groups;
indeed, independence from special interests is one of the hallmarks of the
judiciary. However, as the task ofjudging becomes increasingly political
in nature, it is important that judges have a range of backgrounds and
perspectives that can be brought to the difficult process of deciding
between conflicting and complex social claims. Suffice it for present
purposes to say, that there is a link between the role of the judge in
Canadian society and the qualifications that should be considered in the
appointment of judges.
In response to anti-activist critics, supporters of judicial activism say
such activism is necessary because it allows the courts to step in and fill
gaps in the law where minorities are not protected because of political
pressures and where politicians are afraid to legislate.48 Yet, Frederick
45. Supra note 5 at 130-31.
46. R. Devlin, W. MacKay & N. Kim, "Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation,
Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary or Towards A 'Triple P' Judiciary" (2000) 38 Alta. L.
Rev. 734 at 751.
47. Ibid. at 788-811.
48. MacGuigan, supra note 36 at 31.
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Vaughan says, "what has come to be known as 'judicial activism' is little
more than the sharp edge of judicial review - the act by which judges
assess the validity of legislation or government regulations."49 Histori-
cally, Canadian courts have tended to follow the British tradition of
restraint or deference rather than the more activist stance of American
judges, but "because of the federal nature of Canada's constitution, with
spheres of legislativejurisdiction divided between the federal and provin-
cial governments, our Courts have always been more directly involved in
the politics of the country than British courts."50
Justice Rosalie Abella, of the Ontario Court of Appeal, has commented
on the difference between the relationship to the public of judges and
legislators. Legislators are elected to implement the public will, yet "the
public will is often difficult to ascertain or implement." The judiciary is
accountable "less to the public's opinions and more to the public
interest."'" Justice Abella, speaking at Osgoode Hall Law School, further
stated: "While legislatures respond of necessity to the urgings of the
public, however we define it, judges serve only justice."52
The nature of the institution puts constraints on judges - a fact of life
recognized in the writings of the late Chief Justices Laskin and Dickson.53
It is well recognized that, "credibility and trust are the main sources of
judicial power, and judges are concerned that if they step too far beyond
traditional judicial bounds their rulings will lose legitimacy."54 At the
1998 Canadian Bar Association's Annual Meeting, Justice Lamer em-
phasized the importance of support for the Bench in the midst of a media
frenzy about judicial activism: "the judges have come to command a
certain degree of respect or it's chaos and the whole system falls apart. 55
New Brunswick Chief Justice William Hoyt went after the provincial
government for not defending judges that are attacked by the media and
conservative politicians: "Only rarely, when judges or the courts have
been unfairly attacked, have the (New Brunswick Justice) department
spoken up."'56
49. F. Vaughan, "Judicial Politics in Canada: Pattern and Trends" (1999) 5:1 Choices 4 at 5.
50. Ibid. at 6. See also MacKay, supra note 44.
51. P. Crawley, "Judges and the Public Interest" Globe and Mail (14 April 2000) A 14.
52. Ibid. at A 14.
53. B. Laskin, The Institutional Character of the Judge (London: Oxford Press, 1972); B.
Dickson, "The Judiciary-Law Interpreters or Law Makers" (1982) 12 Man. L. J. 1.
54. Devlin et al., supra note 46 at 744.
55. M. Bourrie & E. Atkins, "Judges Fighting Back" (1999) 25:8 Can. Law. 18(5) at 19.
56. Ibid.
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In December 1998, the Judicial Council - headed by former Chief
Justice Lamer - came out with a list of rules dealing with the scope for
judicial pronouncements. The chair of the committee who drafted the
rules, Manitoba Chief Justice Richard Scott, said, "There are certain
circumstances when a judge can speak out, and that is when the system
is under attack." 7 He said judges should comment publicly when the
courts are accused of being soft on crime or when people say that judges
are over-stepping their bounds by "interpreting and enforcing the Char-
ter."58 However, on social and political issues of the day, he said, "restraint
is the watchword."59 By nature judges are conservative in their style and
careful about what they say. Restraint comes naturally to most, so one could
say that "the Bench is an unlikely habitat for revolutionaries."'
b. Exercising the New Judicial Role: Dialogue Not Dissonance
The defenders of the new more activist role for the courts on matters of
public policy point to the dialogue between the courts and the legislatures
that has been sparked by Charter review. As Professor Kent Roach
argues, neither the judges nor the legislators have the final say under the
Canadian Constitution, because of the section 33 opt out clause and the
section 1 reasonable limits justification.6' What is encouraged is an on-
going dialogue between the various branches of government, which
should produce laws that better balance the competing interests, thereby
better serving the Canadian public. However, not everyone takes this
positive view of the Charter.
The tension between the role of Parliament and the Judiciary in making
and interpreting law is explicit in the context of the debate surrounding
the Charter. Robert Fulford, in his article, "A Charter of Wrongs," 62
refers to the United States Constitution, saying that judges, rather than
elected officials, dictate every detail of public policy. By allowing this
type of subjectivity and flexibility in the interpretation of equality
guarantees in the Canadian Charter, he asserts that a new class of
potential dictators is created.63 Professor Andrew Petter (formerly a
British Columbia Cabinet Minister) also takes issue with the Charter,
57. Ibid. at 21
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. A.W. MacKay, "Fairness After the Charter: A rose by any other name?" (1985) 10
Queen's L.J. 263 at 335, n. 302.
61. Supra note 30 at 483.
62. R. Fulford, "Charter of Wrongs" Saturday Night (December 1986) 7.
63. Ibid.
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calling it "a regressive instrument more likely to undermine than to
advance the interests of the socially and economically disadvantaged
Canadians."'
Section 33 and Other Responses
The Charter's judicial mandate is formally circumscribed by two legis-
lative "escape hatches." Section 1 states that "The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."65 Section 33
permits Parliament or a legislature to "expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature that the Act or provision thereof shall
operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to
15 of this Charter. 66
As Canadian lawyer Edward Greenspan sardonically put it in a speech
he gave in Washington D.C. on freedom of expression, section 1 says:
People of Canada! Don't get overly excited about what you are about to
read. We know this is our Charter of Rights a pack of rights that include
freedom of expression, freedom of press, right to ajury trial, and the right
to fundamental justice (we couldn't even bring ourselves to call it due
process). But before you get too excited, we want you to know that all of
the so-called guaranteed rights you are about to read are subject to
reasonable limits that may be imposed by the government upon you in a
free and democratic society.
67
He comments that unlike the American First Amendment, "[f]ree speech
in Canada begins with 'ifs', 'buts' and 'whereases."' 61 The effect is that
the government can pass any law as long as it can be justified as
reasonable.
While section 1 may appear to provide enough leeway for the govern-
ment, section 33 acts as a further safeguard for legislatures. With this
section, a law can be immunized against all challenges, without any
required justification.69 Former Prime Minster Brian Mulroney made it
clear that he believed section 33 was a mistake. In a speech to the House
of Commons in 1989 he said that the notwithstanding clause limited
64. A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45 The
Advocate 857 at 857.
65. Charter, supra note 1.
66. Ibid.
67. E. Greenspan, "Freedom of Expression in Canada: Ifs, Buts, & Whereases" (Ambassador's
Lecture Series Presentation, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., 26 September 1995)
(1995) 29 L. Soc. Gaz. 212 at 215.
68. Ibid. at 216.
69. Hon. B. McLachlin, "Charter Myths" (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23 at 28.
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fundamental freedoms and that "never before [had] the surrender of rights
been so total and abject."7
In what has been called "the quintessential Canadian compromise,"7"
section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms attempts to
balance power between the courts and the legislatures. The clause allows
the legislatures and the Parliament of Canada, in certain instances, to
override the provisions in the Charter. Professor Peter Russell says that
the legislative override clause provides a process whereby thejustice and
wisdom of a judicial decision can be publicly discussed and possibly
rejected.72 Judges are not infallible and are sometimes exposed to "the
scantiest submissions on, the relationship of a challenged law to its total
social or policy context."73 Furthermore, both courts and legislatures are
capable of being unreasonable, thus, "[b]y providing a legislative counter-
weight to judicial power the Canadian Charter establishes a prudent
system of checks and balances and gives closure to the decisions of
neither."74
Section 33 has been used by only two provincial legislatures: Quebec
and Saskatchewan. It has been publicly contemplated in Alberta but not
used there, and it has never been successfully used in Parliament. Leeson
calls the notwithstanding clause a "paper tiger." Section 33 may be
available in theory, but he feels "that the less it is used, the less likely it
will be used."75 While Alberta Premier Ralph Klein mused about invok-
ing the notwithstanding clause, he withdrew his threat when the public
proved to be quite unsupportive: "[tihe negative reaction by the people of
Alberta to the use of the notwithstanding clause seems to point to a
general reluctance of the public to support the use of the override
provision of the Charter. 76
In Vriend v. Alberta77 , the Supreme Court of Canada ordered the
Alberta provincial government to add sexual orientation to the list of
characteristics protected under the province's human rights law. The
apparently widespread negative public reaction to the ruling did not
70. House of Commons Debates (6 April 1989) at 152-53. Professor Ted Morton, in a recent
editorial piece, also argues that Prime Minister Chr6tien should be less apologetic about section
33 and defend its virtues. F.L. Morton, "Chr6tien and the Charter" National Post (6 November
2000). He also praised then Canadian Alliance leader Stockwell Day and supported his call for
a principled use of section 33 to set aside bad judicial decisions.
71. H. Leeson, "Section 33, The Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?" (2000) 6:4
Choices 3 at 3.
72. P. Russell, "Standing up for Notwithstanding" (1991) 29 Alta L. Rev. 293 at 295.
73. Ibid. at 308.
74. Ibid. at 301.
75. Leeson, supra note 71 at 20.
76. Vaughan, supra note 49 at 15.
77. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter Vriendl.
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extend to support of the notwithstanding clause. Research conducted by
the Institute for Research on Public Policy found that of those who had
heard about the case, a substantial majority in every region, including the
Prairies, favored the Court's ruling.78 Broken down by political party
affiliation, Reform supporters showed the lowest level of support, which
was still 49.1% in favor of the decision of the Court. Fletcher and Howe
compliment Premier Klein's political wisdom in acceding to the Courts
ruling in the Vriend case, despite the vocal protests of some!79 For critics,
the political consequences of the Supreme Court decision in Vriend
represented a judicial trumping of legitimate provincial policy choices.
However, the data from the research suggest that the majority of Cana-
dians, even the majority of Albertans, concurred with the court, believing
that homosexuals should receive the full protection of basic human rights
legislation.8" Quite apart from majority sentiments, the enhanced version
of democracy discussed earlier would support a proper consideration of
minority interests, even if the minority group was not popular.
The argument with respect to section 33 centres around rights and the
best way to protect them. Public and political opinion is unsettled about
whether the use of the override is appropriate either at all, or in what
circumstances. Hiebert says that if legislative decisions are based on
careful and sensitive consideration of how best to balance conflicting
rights and values, and these decisions are nevertheless invalidated by the
judiciary, the override might have greater acceptance.8' The hope in the
override clause is that it will be used "to preserve social arrangements that
have been carefully worked out by legislators through a process in which
competing interests have been fully explored and understood and com-
promises have been thoughtfully constructed. ' '8 2
Parliament can rely on the override to resolve serious political/judicial
differences. However, Parliament's power to override judicial decisions
is not simply the retention of parliamentary supremacy, unadulterated, as
existed prior to the Charter. Section 33 allows for "legislative review of
judicial review," 8 3 promoting responsibility by forcing Parliament and
the judiciary to maintain a consciousness of one another.84 This section
78. J. Fletcher & P. Howe, "Supreme Court Cases and Court Support: The State of the
Canadian Public Opinion" (2000) 6:3 Choices 30 at 39 [hereinafter "Supreme Court"].
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.at40,42.
81. J. Hiebert, "Wrestling with Rights: Judges, Parliament and the Making of Policy" (July
1999) 5:3 Choices 3 at 32.
82. J. Whyte, "On Not Standing for Notwithstanding" (1990) 28 Alta L. Rev. 347 at 354.
83. P. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. I at 32, quoted in Morton, supra note 24 at 54.
84. Morton, ibid.
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of the Constitution, "does not diminish Parliament's obligation to give
effect to the Charter's values in the course of developing and passing
legislation. 8 5 Therefore, "[a]lthough Parliament has the power to ensure
the primacy of its decision, this power should be exercised only after
careful consideration of why its views on an issue deserve to be para-
mount."86 In most cases, the use of section 33 would be considered to be
"radical overkill, the equivalent of dropping the nuclear bomb in a war."87
There are other less costly and much less controversial methods available
to legislatures to achieve their objectives.
Professor Russell argues that the advantage of retaining a role for
legislators in the determination of rights is not to ensure that the will of
the majority prevails, but to facilitate the democratic idea of government
by discussion.88 Parliamentary institutions enable government to have a
mutual exchange of ideas, mutual criticism of ideas and to elicit and enlist
(as much as possible) the general capacity of every member.89 Combined,
sections 1 and 33 are powerful tools which result in a balancing of the
judicial and legislative roles. If anything, the section 33 override would
imply that the courts do not have the power to be as interventionist as is
argued by Morton and Knopff.
Influence of the Charter on the Legislators
Because their decisions are subject to judicial review for Charter consis-
tency, governments are somewhat constrained in their ability to pursue
legislative priorities. 9° Sensitivity to the Charter does not mean that
policies are forsaken because they incur Charter risks; however, less
risky ways to accomplish policy objectives may be considered. Two
divergent views have emerged about the Charter's influence on the
political will to pursue policies that attract rights-based criticism.
The view put forward by Professor Michael Mandel is that the Charter
offers a convenient refuge for politicians to avoid or delay difficult moral
decisions.9' Insulating themselves from political criticism, elected repre-
sentatives can look to the court to resolve rights issues; thus, as Hiebert
argues, "the Charter may diminish political resolve to define pressing
social problems and exercise judgment about how best to reconcile these
with constitutional standards. ' 92 Avoiding difficult and controversial
85. Hiebert, supra note 81 at 32
86. Ibid. at 32.
97. Leeson, supro note 71 at 19.
88. Russell, supra note 72 at 299.
89. E. Barker, Reflections on Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1948) at 36.
See also supra note 72 at 300.
90. Hiebert, supra note 81 at 3.
91. Supra note 2.
92. Hiebert, supra note 81 at 4.
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decisions by waiting for a decision from the courts may be a tempting
method of avoiding controversial issues. Hiebert argues that answers to
rights conflicts should not be assumed to be uniquely and intrinsically
legal. Rather "social conflicts are political in the sense that they invoke
differing philosophical assumptions about which values are important,
what priorities should be attached to conflicting rights, and what the role
of the state should be in defining and responding to social and cultural
concerns."93 The abdication of political responsibility to the courts serves
to weaken the fabric of democratic decision- making:
[T]he danger here is not so much that non-elected judges will impose their
will on a democratic majority, but that questions of social and political
justice will be transformed into technical legal questions and the great bulk
of the citizenry who are not judges and lawyers will abdicate their
responsibility for working out reasonable and mutually acceptable resolu-
tions of the issues which divide them.
94
The other view, put forward by Dean Peter Hogg, is that in a process
of "dialogue" between the legislatures and the courts, the Charter need
not frustrate legislative objectives. The Supreme Court rarely rules that
a legislative objective itself is inconsistent with the Charter; rather it
scrutinizes the reasonableness of the means by which legislative objec-
tives are implemented. Legislatures are then given the opportunity to
revise legislation with more attention to how they can achieve their
legislative objectives with less intrusion upon Charter rights. Dean Hogg
suggests that the Charter facilitates a healthy dialogue about how best to
reconcile the individualistic values of the Charter with the accomplish-
ment of social and economic policies for the benefit of the community as
a whole.95
In 1982, a Human Rights Law Section was established in the Depart-
ment of Justice to review existing legislation for Charter conflicts and
provide ongoing advice about Charter issues. Justice lawyers in the
Human Rights section have encouraged other departments to seek
Charter advice early in the process of developing policy, so that legisla-
tive objectives can be accomplished in a manner that is likely to survive
a Charter challenge and minimize disruption in obtaining the policy goal.
Another advantage of thinking about Charter implications early is that
93. Ibid. at 4.
94. P. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(1983) 61 Can. Bar. Rev. 30 at 52.
95. P.W. Hogg and A.A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between the Courts and the
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L. J. 75 at 104-105.
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legislators are able to anticipate possible Charter challenges and con-
sciously develop a legislative record for addressing judicial concerns. 96
Hiebert shows that political response to the Charter has been active.
When the Supreme Court struck down tobacco legislation in RJR-
MacDonald97 , the government revised its initiative and passed new
legislation. Legislative initiatives addressing rules for sexual assault
trials and access to private records provide even stronger examples of
how Parliament is not reneging on the responsibility to pursue important
social policy rights. Twice legislation has been passed showing how
Parliament interprets rights differently from the majority of the Supreme
Court. The differences appear in the legislative responses to a trilogy of
Supreme Court decisions: R. v. Seaboyer,98 R. v. O'Connor,99 and R. v.
Carosella.'o
After the Rape Shield provisions in the Criminal Code... were ruled
unconstitutional, Parliament responded with Bill C-49. This bill demon-
strated that Parliament was not prepared to accept the ruling of the
Supreme Court as the final word. This new bill was developed after
extensive consultation with women's groups and received all party
support: "Parliament addressed and responded to Charter concerns in a
manner that was neither dismissive of rights-based criticisms nor intiri-
dated by suggestions that the judiciary was the more appropriate venue
for resolving ... [this conflict]."' 2
In O'Connor, the majority of the Court ruled that women's confiden-
tial treatment records are relevant and necessary for a full answer and
defense in a fair trial. Following the decision, the government introduced
Bill C-46 in reaction to what it considered too low a threshold for gaining
access to private medical records. The government felt that access to
these records is neither as relevant, nor should access be granted as
frequently, as the majority of the Court suggested. By imposing addi-
tional criteria, the legislation requires a judge to assess the situation
carefully before ordering that records be produced. The legislation
received support from all parties and was accompanied by a preamble
stating Parliament's intent.
96. Hiebert, supra note 81 at 7.
97. RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), 11994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [hereinafter RJR-
MacDonald].
98. R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [hereinafter Seaboyer].
99. R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [hereinafter O'Connor].
100. R. v. Carosella, [1997] I S.C.R. 80 [hereinafter Carosella].
101. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276.
102. Hiebert, supra note 81 at 17.
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Hiebert suggests that these legislative initiatives, which differ signifi-
cantly from judicial views on the same topic, do not constitute a dismissal
of the priorities of constitutional values and obligations. Nor are they
explained by ignorance of the Charter or triumph of partisan, electoral or
self-serving interests over rights based principles. Rather, these legisla-
tive initiatives are based on "a deliberate and conscious intent to change
the prevailing normative and legal assumptions for sexual assault trials
and to alert the judiciary to an alternative interpretation of the Charter
which situates trial fairness in a broader context of respect for other
Charter rights."103
This same process of openly balancing the competing interests is
continued in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, R. v.
Darrach.'° In this case, the Court was asked to further reconsider the
application of the Rape Shield laws and their impact upon the fair trial of
an accused person. After an open balancing of the principles of fairness,
equality, and privacy, the Court upheld the existing legislation and its
application in this particular case. One of the lessons of this case is that
the dialogue between the courts and the legislatures can be an on-going
one, but that the courts may give the same answer more than once. At
some point there is presumably little left to discuss. It also suggests that
the legislators can influence the thinking of the judges as well as the
reverse. It is assumed that the legislation will not continue to go back and
forth like a yo yo, but that the legislators will acquiesce to the court's view
or the courts will change their stance.
The ideal of institutional dialogue between the courts and the legisla-
tures requires listening and responding to the other party's concerns. One
way to facilitate this conversation, Hiebert suggests, is to establish a
parliamentary committee with specific responsibilities to evaluate bills
from a Charter perspective.° 5 She suggests that the purpose of such a
committee would be different from bureaucratic scrutiny. Its purpose
would be to ensure that legislative decisions, which have implications for
fundamental rights, are made only after more deliberation. The role of the
committee, "would be to provide a foundation for Parliament's collective
and principled judgment about whether policies are important and
compelling in light of the Charter and consistent with the values of a free
and democratic society."'" Hiebert suggests that rights claims should be
seen as part of a complex political process in which political actors must
103. ibid. at 26.
104. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443.
105. Supra note 81 at 27.
106. Ibid. at 28.
62 The Dalhousie Law Journal
evaluate the strength of the claim alongside the importance of a legislative
objective. 107
Hiebert's concept differs significantly from the parliamentary Charter
committee suggested by the Reform party. Former opposition Leader
Preston Manning's suggestion was that a judicial review committee
would systematically review Supreme Court of Canada decisions that
find federal laws in contravention of the Charter. This committee would
then consider whether to change the legislation or to use the notwithstand-
ing clause. While Peter Russell asked, "[w]hy should Parliament wait
until the horse is out of the barn to consider Charter implications of
legislation,"'08 Manning felt that prior review of legislation was unlikely,
"to rein in thejudges.""3° Hiebert argues that Manning's criticism misses
the point, since "independent of whether courts will be influenced by the
committee scrutiny of legislation, Parliament owes it to itself and to
Canadians to take a more active and independent role to interpret and
apply the Charter in respect to social policy and to exercise its collective
judgment about whether legislation is constitutionallyjustified." 0 Hiebert
recognizes the institutional disagreement will not end simply because
Parliament has taken its responsibilities under the Charter more seri-
ously. If the court still disagrees with the government, the government
needs to pay careful consideration as to why the court was troubled with
the legislation, rather than respond to a negative ruling with immediate
consideration of the override."' All branches of the state are responsible
for the implementation of the Charter values.
While judges have the prerogative to disagree with legislative deci-
sions regardless of how carefully thought out they are, "a systematic and
proactive approach to the Charter will signal to judges that the legislature
has been mindful of the Charter and has exercised its informed judgment
about how the Charter should be interpreted and applied to social
policy. 1" 2 When courts are aware of Parliament's sensitivity to the
Charter, they may be more willing to accept parliamentary decisions with
respect to social policy objectives." 3
107. Ibid. at 28.
108. P.H. Russell, "Reform's Judicial Agenda" (1999) 20:3 Policy Options 12 at 13.
109. E. Preston Manning, "A 'B' for Prof. Russell" (1999) 20:3 Policy Options 15 at 15.
110. Supra note 81 at 29.
111. Ibid. at30.
112. Ibid. at 31.
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3. A Legitimate Expansion of the Judicial Process to Promote
"Contextualized" Decision-Making
A major component of the Morton and Knopff critique of judging after
the Charter has to do less with the wording of the Charter itself, than with
what the judges have done with it. They contend that judges have strayed
into the policy-making arena in a way that calls the legitimacy of the
judiciary into question. Morton and Knopff particularly object to the use
of the courts by various interest groups to circumvent the political process
and to use the courts to advance their causes in the judicial, rather than
political, arena.
a. Interest Group Intervention
The term the authors coin to describe these beneficiaries of judicial
activism under the Charter is the "Court Party":
If judges are a more important cause of the Charter revolution than the
Charter itself, an even more significant cause is the Court Party. The social
movements composing the Court Party would have grown in prominence
even without the Charter; they would not have gone so far so fast, however.
The Charter gave them a new venue, the courtroom, to pursue their
agendas and conferred on them the status needed to participate in the arena
of constitutional politics. The result has been enhanced legitimacy (and
generous state funding) for Court Party efforts in the legal arena."4
There would no doubt be some overlap between the Court Party and
what Justice McClung in the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Vriend
v. Alberta"5 , colourfully referred to as, a "rights-euphoric cost-scoffing
lefty". In chapter three of their book, Morton and Knopff describe the
various members of the Court Party as falling in the following categories:
unifiers (referring to the nationalizing agenda of former Prime Minister
Trudeau's Charter); civil libertarians; equality seekers; social engineers
(including feminists and the gay rights movement); and post materialists.
In this latter category the authors refer to the producers of knowledge and
information such as universities (and in particular law schools).
Morton and Knopff see this new "knowledge class" as playing a vital
role in supporting the Court Party by providing administrative supports,
rights-experts, and advocacy scholarship. The authors also see this new
"knowledge class" as decidedly on the left of the political spectrum, and
out of touch with the majority of society.
114. Supra note 3 at 59.
115. (1996), 181 A.R. 16 (C.A.) [hereinafter Vriendv. Alberta], rev'd [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
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While postmaterialist interest groups are not occupational groups, they do
have a class character. In particular, the new postmaterialist concerns are
most prevalent outside the working classes. The reform elements con-
cerned with postmaterialist or social issues largely derive their strength not
from the workers and the less privileged, the social base of the [economic]
left in industrial society, but from segments of the well educated and
affluent, students, academics, journalists, professionals and civil servants.
The latter are all participants in the 'knowledge industry' that is a new
focus of power in post-industrial democracies. Just as property was the
foundation of elite power in industrial society, so knowledge (based on
high levels of education) is the vehicle of power in post-industrial politics
of the administrative state.
Of course, it is as difficult today as it has always been for a 'knowledge
class' to exercise power through majoritarian institutions (consider Plato's
philosopher kings). This helps to explain why postmaterialism is attracted
to the anti-majoritarian power of the courts. Unlike the progressive
reformers of past generations who sought to transfer power from the few
rich to the many poor, the postmaterialist left finds itself in the minority
and sees the majority as a problem. Inglehart has demonstrated that
postmaterialist values are much more prominent among intellectual,
bureaucratic, media, and political elites than among the general popula-
tion. This fact, he argued, created a 'tactical dilemma' for 'the Left in
contemporary society.' 116
The argument is that the Court Party speaks through intervenors such
as the Legal Education and Action Fund ((LEAF) and the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association (CCLA) to influence the courts and even capture
their agenda. There is no question that the number of interventions in
court cases has increased since the Charter, and that the diversity and
range of these groups have grown. However, I would suggest that the
protection of minorities is important in upholding democratic values, not
the anti-democratic conspiracy decried by Morton and Knopff. Democ-
racy is about representing everyone in society, not only the majority.
Interest group litigation is important because it, "affects the style and
substance of our political life."117 Hein argues that the account advanced
by conservative critics is incomplete and misleading. While Morton and
Knopff may be correct that social activists are eager to pursue legal
strategies, "their interpretation ignores the fact that economic interests
also appreciate the benefits of litigation.""1 8
116. Supra note 3 at 78-79.
117. G. Hein, "Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy" (2000) 6:2 Choices 3 at 3.
118. Ibid.at4.
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A diverse range of interests pursue litigation because governments and
courts have created new opportunities to participate. Since 1982, govern-
ments have introduced funding programs and statutory rights to make
administrative regimes, the regulatory process, and the judicial system
more accessible. "9 The Supreme Court has also introduced changes that
have encouraged interest group litigation. The old common law rule of
standing has been liberalized in stages. The old law favoured property
owners and corporations trying to protect private rights and filtered out
citizens who wanted to address public problems.2 0 Under the new rule,
applicants who ask a serious legal question and demonstrate a genuine
interest can win access if certain conditions are satisfied. Rules for
intervening have also been relaxed where groups with a record of
advocacy displaying expertise in a particular area usually receive permis-
sion to appear.12 1
Hein's study found, "the propensity to litigate is elevated by three
stable characteristics: impressive legal resources, identities bolstered by
rights, and normative visions that demand judicial activism."2 Organi-
zations not inclined to litigate can take advantage of interpretive oppor-
tunities, counter immediate threats, and move policy battles into the
courtroom when their political resources wane. Hein found that interests
that have the greatest potential to influence public policy through litiga-
tion are those affected by both stable characteristics and changing
circumstances.
While constrained courts would cause fewer disruptions, Canadian
society would pay a price. The relative calm found by "traditional judicial
review" favours corporations but filters out interests and values of public
interest. 23 Majority interest groups, of course, have greater access to, and
impact on, the legislative branch based on their numbers and political
clout. The obstacles created by returning to former court rules of standing
would hinder interests concerned with racism, homophobia, gender
inequality, environmental degradation, poverty, the lives of the disabled,
and the plight of Aboriginal peoples. The surprising conclusion of Hein's
study is that corporate interest groups and those favouring a conservative
view, such as the National Citizens' Coalition, fare well in the courts,
119. Ibid at 10.
120. Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; Nova Scotia Board of
Censors v. McNeil, [197612 S.C.R. 265; Minister of Justice v. Borowski, [198112 S.C.R. 575;
Minister of Finance of Canada v. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607; and Canadian Council of
Churches v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236.
121. I. Brodie, "Intervenors and the Charter" in F.L. Morton, Law, Politics and the Judicial
Process in Canada 2d ed. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992) at 224.
122. Supra note 117 at 16.
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even under the relaxed standing rules. Thus according to Hein's study,
corporate interests continue to have good access to both political and
judicial decision-makers.
The opening up of the judicial process to a wider range of interests and
perspectives is part of a general evolution of all courts (especially the
Supreme Court of Canada) to make their decisions in armorecontextualized
form. This is a positive development that allows the courts to avoid the
arid legalism for which they have been criticized in the past by people
such as Paul Weiler. 4 Contextualizing judicial decisions has become the
hallmark of the modem judiciary and an important principle to be
followed in all areas, not just constitutional law. 25 In my recent study
based upon computer research, I discovered that the Supreme Court of
Canada used the term "context" in its decisions 400% more since the
arrival of the Charter in 1982. 126 The use of the term also increases with
each successive Chief Justice - beginning with Laskin and continuing
through to the current Chief Justice, McLachlin.
This opening up of the judicial process is based on a recognition by the
courts of the complexity of legal problems in modern society. There is
less consensus in Canada than there used to be as to what is the "right
answer" to complex problems, such as abortion, the definition of the
family, or the proper meaning of equality. Based upon interviews with
judges, the authors of Final Appeal 27 confirm this assertion that at the
Supreme Court of Canada level, judges recognize the complexity of
searching for correct legal answers. Therefore, these judges appreciate
the various perspectives on a problem that can be provided by intervenors
as well as the parties to the dispute:
Our interviews with Supreme Court of Canada judges indicated that all
those interviewed were aware of this desire in the lower courts for 'one
right answer,' but the majority thought that it would be intellectually
dishonest to move in that direction, because in most cases there were, in
fact, several competing 'correct' answers, and the development of the law
is stimulated by exposing readers to alternate modes of reasoning. 128
The dangers of not considering a range of different perspectives is
reflected in the criticism by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 of the lower court
decision of Justice McClung in R. v. Ewanchuk129 While Morton and
Knopff argue that the success rate of women's groups, such as LEAF, in
124. Supra note 25.
125. S. Sugunasiri, "Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Analy-
sis and Accountability" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 126.
126. Supra note 44 at 265.
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128. Ibid. at 16.
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leading equality cases is proof of the extent to which courts have become
captive to special interest groups, they fail to consider the courts' own
articulation of a broader and more sophisticated version of equality.
Judges are not so weak as to be influenced by lobby groups to reach an
inappropriate result. This would run counter to their deep traditions of
judicial independence. However, they are becoming increasingly open to
the idea that the Charter should be given a broad and purposive interpre-
tation. A range of different perspectives and evidence enriches this
interpretation process. The broad and purposive approach that courts
have taken to the process of Charter interpretation reflects their views on
the centrality of Charter values in our new constitutional structure, and
the role of the courts in protecting these rights and values. It is not a matter
of the courts being lead astray, but rather the judges themselves reaching
conclusions that Morton and Knopff do not like. Their real objection to
the new role of the courts is substantive and not just procedural.
b. The Emerging Jurocracy
It is not only the influence of interest groups and the Court Party that
concerns Morton and Knopff, but also the process of decision-making
within the judicial bureaucracy itself. According to their analysis, the
judges have fallen victim not only to forces outside the court structure, but
also to those within. The enemies within are identified as the law clerks
who, while toiling in relative obscurity, are alleged to have a major impact
on the decisions of the appeal courts, especially the Supreme Court of
Canada:
When we think of courts andjudicial decision-making, we think mainly of
judges. In fact there is a new set ofjudicial decision-makers invisible to the
public but increasingly influential. These are the clerks, the scores of
recent law school graduates who assist appeal court judges in researching
and writing opinions.
This rapid growth in the number and functions of the clerks has effected
a devolution of power from the top (judges) to the middle (clerks) of the
bureaucratic pyramid.130
The alleged influence of these law clerks is made more sinister by their
links to their former law schools (charter members of the knowledge
class). These law clerks are described as the conveyor belt by which the
ideas of the Court Party are injected into the judicial bureaucracy:
130. Supranote3at 110.
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The clerks' drafting and filtering functions are coloured by close ties to
their law schools. Selected annually from the top graduates of Canadian
law schools, they serve as an intellectual conveyor belt from the law
schools to the inner sanctum of the Supreme Court. The clerks on the US
Supreme Court have been described as a 'law school conduit' as they
'carry the attitudes of the revisionist academic culture directly to the
federal judges' .... Professors are likely to have been clerks to federal
judges, and they send their best students to clerkships. 31
Morton and Knopff also express concern about the Charter orientation
of these predominantly young law clerks and how that may influence the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. They state:
Unlike the judges for whom they work, the clerks have'studied the Charter
in high school, university, and law school.' This 'formative period of their
legal education has been one in which the rights of women, linguistic and
ethnic minorities, refugees, prisoners and other groups are perceived to
have been enhanced as a direct result of Supreme Court action. With some
exceptions, clerks tended to applaud these developments and sought to
extend them further.' In sum, the influence of clerks has been an important
factor in the Court Party's success before the Supreme Court. As in all
dealings with government bureaucracies, having supporters on the inside
is the ultimate form of positional support. 32
As a former law clerk to the late Chief Justice Laskin, I feel that Morton
and Knopff have overstated the role of the law clerk and underestimated
the fierce independence of judges in making their own decisions in all
cases that come before them. While law clerks play an important role,
they are not judges in disguise. The role of the law clerk is to assist the
judge by researching the law and bringing a different perspective to the
legal issues at hand but not to make the decisions or write the judgements.
Certainly I did not write decisions for Chief Justice Laskin and I expect
that the same is likely true for other law clerks. In relation to the power
and influence of law professors, once again I think that Morton and
Knopff are misguided. Academics do have a role to play in assisting
judges to put their decisions in a broader context, but the final-decision is
always that of the judge. It is true that the reference to the writing of legal
academics has increased in recent years, but the Court usually considers
scholarship on both sides of a legal dispute, and the judges have not
abdicated their ultimate decision-making role to the "knowledge class".
Law schools (even Dalhousie) are not as powerful institutions as the
authors of the book suggest.
131. Ibid. at 112. lam identified by Morton and Knopff as one of those former law clerks (to
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Beyond the allegation that the judges are influenced by both internal
and external forces, Morton and Knopff also suggest that thejudges have
over-stepped their traditional boundaries. The more serious attack on the
legitimacy of the role of the courts under the Charter is one that is based
on the invasion of traditional policy-making terrain by the courts. As
Professor Kent Roach indicates this should be less of an issue in Canada
than it is in the United States. 3 3 Canada does not have a clear separation
of powers, and sections 1 and 33 of the Charter invite the kind of court!
legislature dialogue discussed earlier in this paper. Morton and Knopff
also object to an expanded judicial role because of the lack of judicial
accountability. It is also easy to overstate the extent to which judges are
above accountability. Not only must they articulate reasons for their
decisions, they are also taken to account by the media, academics, and
last, but not least, by the relevantjudicial councils. The accountability and
democratic nature of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment should also not be assumed. This problem has been discussed earlier
in respect of the concentration of power in the executive branch of
government.
Critics of the post-Charter courts claim that judicial rulings on
contentious matters, from gay rights to police procedures, are effectively
making law that would be better left to democratically elected represen-
tatives. This is a central feature of the Morton and Knopff critique of the
jurocracy. But as discussed earlier, the courts do have an important role
to play in the more nuanced version of democracy that goes beyond the
majoritarian version of the democratic state. Supporters of the post-
Chartercourts seejudicial review as a safeguard of fundamental individual
and minority rights.'34
No matter how controversial some Charter decisions have been, there
can be no question that Canadians have embraced the Charter; it has
provided an "indigenous point of national coalescence."' 3 5 Despite the
criticisms of Morton and Knopff and other conservatives, judges are held
in higher esteem than legislatures. A recent poll indicates that the public
not only rejects the idea that judges have too much power, but instead
believes that judges should have more power. 13 6 Research conducted by
professors at York University found that 70% of Canadians had, "some
degree of confidence" in the courts, while only 46% had "some degree of
133. Supra note 30 at 532.
134. J.F. Fletcher & P. Howe, "Canadian Attitudes Toward the Charter and the Courts in
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confidence" in legislators; fifty-two percent of Canadians thought the
ethical principles of judges were higher than average, while only 17%
thought members of legislature had that same level of ethical prin-
ciples.137
Joseph Fletcher and Paul Howe asked what Canadians thought about
the Charter and the new responsibilities of the courts since the Charter.
Specifically, are they satisfied with thejudicial politics? Would they like
courts to show greater deference toward government? Or are Canadians
happy with the Charter and the work of the courts?138 They assert that
"[i]f citizens were largely satisfied, it would seem difficult to sustain the
critics' objections, which are, after all, grounded in the supposition that
the views of the majority should be afforded greater weight." 3 9 Fletcher
and Howe use data from a national survey of 1,005 Canadians commis-
sioned by The Institute for Research on Public Policy in 1999 and
previous studies from 1987. It is always wise to be cautious with statistics
and their use, but even allowing forpolling error and misinterpretation the
conclusions of these studies are interesting.
When .Canadians were asked who should have the final say on
controversial issues, they favored the courts by a 2 to 1 ratio in both 1987
and 1999.140 Canadians across virtually all social and democratic strata
and in every region of the country showed this pattern. A statistically
significant difference between Canadians was found when political
partisanship was considered. Members of the Reform party showed an
even split on their answer to this question, with 44.4% favoring the court
and the same percentage favoring the legislature. 4' Even when asked,
"what if the Supreme Court of Canada started making decisions that most
people disagreed with?" the majority of Canadians polled still expressed
support for courts having the final say. 142
Fletcher and Howe elsewhere found that Supreme Court of Canada
decisions enjoying widespread public approval seem to generate support
for the Court, "but on issues where most Canadians disagree with the
Court, their attitudes do not translate into negative feelings toward either
the Charter or the Court." 143 If courts, thanks largely to the Charter, often
undercut legitimate public preferences, as expressed in ongoing legisla-
tive and executive practices, why then do Canadians hold the Charter and
137. "Canadian Attitudes", supra note 134 at 1.
138. Ibid. at 5
139. Ibid. at 5
140. Ibid. at 12.
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142. Ibid. at 17, 19.
143. "Supreme Court", supra note 78 at 31.
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the Courts in such high regard? Contrary to the hopes and expectations of
critics such as Morton and Knopff, recent decisions on controversial
issues have not undermined the strong public support for Canada's
judicial system. "Despite a barrage of criticism recently directed at
certain prominent judicial rulings, support for the courts and the Charter
is holding firm."' 4
III. Objections to a Changing Value Structure: Concluding Thoughts
Although it is not expressly stated, the underlying objection of Professors
Morton and Knopff is not just to the distortion of institutional structures
but also to a change in the basic Canadian value structure. This level of
criticism is implicit in the authors' examination of the expansion of the
concept of equality at the hands of both human rights tribunals and the
courts. Referring to the collaboration of human rights tribunals and courts
as "incestuous" Morton and Knopff make the following observation:
The cross-fertilization of equity concepts and their extension into the
private sphere illustrates the willingness of Court Party equality seekers to
sacrifice liberty in the name of equality. As we observed in chapter 3, the
traditional purpose of constitutional bills of rights is to protect individual
liberty by restricting what the state can do and how. The explicit purpose
of the HRAs is not to protect society from the state but to reform society
through the state. That is, the Charter controls state actions, while an HRA
regulates private actions. Interpreting the Charter to require the expansion
of HRAs, as the Federal HRC urged in Vriend, makes the Charter a state
expanding rather than a state limiting document.145
There is little doubt that Professors Morton and Knopff feel that the
Supreme Court of Canada went too far in many of the leading equality
cases such as Vriend46 and Eldridge v. British Columbia.147 Their
objection is not directed solely at process (objecting to an expanded
judicial role) but also at substance (objecting to the expansion of the
concept of equality). One can have some sympathy for the authors'
"social engineering" critique when cases such as Law v. Canada148 and
Corbierre v. Canada'49 are considered. These cases, which claim to
present a coherent framework for dealing with equality by expanding on
the earlier cases, may have sacrificed predictability in the name of
flexibility and context sensitivity. The discretionary role for judges in
equality cases has been expanded. To define equality in terms of viola-
144. Ibid. at 54.
145. Supra note 3 at 116.
146. Supra note 77.
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tions of dignity, is to define one concept by reference to an equally vague
and open-ended concept. The ambiguity of the definition of Charter
equality in Law is emphasized by the fact that both the majority and the
dissent in M. v. H. 110 cited the principles in the Law case as the bases for
their decisions.
Justice Rosalie Abella, of the Ontario Court of Appeal, makes an
analysis of the Morton and Knopff critique, similar to mine, in the
following passage:
With the arrival of the 1990s, a few abrupt voices were heard to challenge
the Supreme Court, voices in large part belonging to those whose psycho-
logical security or territorial hegemony were at risk from the Charter's
reach. As the decade advanced, so did the courage and insistence of these
New Inhibitors, most of whom appeared to congregate at one end of the
ideological spectrum. While their articulated target was the Supreme
Court of Canada, their real target was the way the Charter was transform-
ing their traditional expectations and entitlements.
They made their arguments skillfully. In essence, they turned the good
news of constitutionalized rights, the mark of a secure and mature
democracy, into the bad news of judicial autocracy, the mark of a
debilitated and devalued legislature. They called minorities seeking the
right to be free from discrimination 'special interest groups seeking to
jump the queue.' They called efforts to reverse discrimination 'reverse
discrimination.'151
Whether or not it is fair to refer to Morton and Knopff as the "New
Inhibitors", there is little doubt that a major part of their objection to the
role of the courts in the post Charter era is that they do not like the values
the judges are promoting. Morton and Knopff see the courts as a vehicle
for the ascendancy of the values of special interest groups, which promote
values with which they do not agree and which they feel do not accord
with the views of the majority of Canadians. However, the poll results
discussed above suggesting a high approval rating for both the courts and
the Charter raise doubts about whether Morton and Knopff really
represent the majority view. In any event, the courts are articulating a
view of individual rights that has been enshrined in the Charter by a
democratic constitutional amendment process.
One way in which Morton and Knopff reveal their values bias is in their
reference to "interest" groups rather than groups promoting "rights".
Their conflation of rights and interests is a subtle way of diminishing
claims to rights, such as equality or environmental protection. There is
150. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
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something unseemly about interest groups lobbying and possibly influ-
encing the courts. The matter takes on a different image if it is described
as groups seeking their constitutional rights by using the courts as the
forum. This is not to suggest that some groups do not dress up interests
in the form of rights to advance their cause. However, it is not a universal
phenomenon, and it is unfair to put all interest groups, including genuine
rights-seekers, in one category.
Finally, the authors assume that the role of the liberal state and the
courts in particular are to be neutral and in some ways value free. Not only
is this not possible, it is also not desirable. The limits on such neutrality
are illustrated by Professor Michael Sandel when referring to the Ameri-
can debate about slavery:
Whatever his personal moral views, Douglas claimed that, for political
purposes at least, he was agnostic on the question of slavery; he did not care
whether slavery was 'voted up or voted down.' Lincoln replied that it was
reasonable to bracket the question of the morality of slavery only on the
assumption that it was not the moral evil he regarded it to be. Any man can
advocate political neutrality 'who does not see anything wrong in slavery,
but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it; because no man
can logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted
down.'152
The debates over abortion and slavery show that a political conception of
justice must sometimes presuppose an answer to the moral and religious
questions it purports to bracket. At least where grave moral questions are
at stake, it is not possible to detach politics and law from substantive moral
judgment. But even in cases where it is possible to conduct political debate
without reference to our moral and religious convictions, it may not always
be desirable. The effort to banish moral and religious argument from the
public realm for the sake of political agreement may end by impoverishing
political discourse and eroding the moral and civic resources necessary to
self-government.'53
I agree with Professor Sandel that the state, in all its forms, cannot be
neutral on controversial and important matters such as abortion, gay
rights, and equality. The role of the courts in a constitutional democracy,
such as Canada, is to give effect to the rights and values expressed in the
Constitution. As the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in Vriend 54 the
Canadian Constitution was adopted in a democratic process by the
elected representatives of the people. Although the courts inherited the
text of the Charter and have given the words meaning, they did not single-
152. M. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996) at 22.
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handedly create its meaning. As Chief Justice McLachlin suggests, all
three branches of government have a role to play in living up to the values
of the Charter:
In fact, the relationship between the elected legislators and the courts in a
constitutional democracy such as ours is symbiotic. Ajust society is not the
product of the elected legislators alone, nor is it the product of effective
administration and enforcement of the laws. A just society is the product
of responsible action by all three segments of government - the elected
legislators, the executive charged with enforcing and administering the
law, and the courts. The courts do not cooperate with the elected legislators
and the executive in an active sense. This is because the courts must be
'independent' of the other two branches of government in order to
discharge their impartial decision-making function. However, it does not
mean that the courts and the legislators do not work together to produce
justice. "I
The courts have generally performed well in giving meaning to the text
of the Charter in a way that fairly balances competing interests. Judges
do not run the country, nor do they likely want to. Those who criticize the
courts are not just concerned with the process and democracy but also
with the values promoted by the courts. These are values embodied in the
Charter and not just a judicial flight of fancy. When a court is interven-
tionist, it is upholding values sacred to this country or limiting individual
rights in the broader interest of the larger society. The courts are not trying
to run the country, but they are attempting to play their legitimate and
important constitutional role. Canada's judges are fellow travellers in the
democratic enterprise with the legislative and executive branches of
government and do not pose the threat to our traditional modes of policy
making that Professors Morton and Knopff suggest they do. While there
is always room for improvement, our courts are generally serving us well.
155. McLachlin, supra note 69 at 35.
